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DANIEL GANDERT AND FABIAN RONISKY
ABSTRACT
The collapse of potentially the biggest fight in boxing history, Floyd
Mayweather Jr. versus Manny Pacquiao, clearly highlights the inadequacy
-­doping policy. The fight, which would have
generated an estimated $200 million during a major recession, was lost
because of the chaotic and fundamentally flawed American anti-­doping
policy. Boxing and the three major American professional sports leagues
the National Football League, National Basketball Association, and Major
League Baseball (The Big Three) have very different structures with
respect to regulating doping;; boxing uses a multi-­jurisdictional approach,
while The Big Three depend on a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)
system. However, both approaches similarly fail to effectively address
doping and will never be able to effectively combat doping practices.
Unlike the American system, the World Anti-­Doping Agency (WADA),
with its unilateral and independent implementation of anti-­doping rules,
successfully regulates international sports.
American anti-­doping approaches currently have many loopholes that
easily permit athletes to dope and have built-­in conflicts of interest that
limit effective regulation. Additionally, the CBA approach has an intrinsic
and thus unavoidably sluggish approach for dealing with new doping issues,
which provides cheaters with a consistent leg up. This article traces the
history of doping in sports, outlines anti-­doping legislation in the United
States, analyzes the problems facing the boxing and CBA anti-­doping
approaches, and presents a remedy for the ailing American system. The pri-­
mary recommendation is for Congress to require that an independent
agency unilaterally implement anti-­doping rules in American professional
sports in a method similar to how the International Olympic Committee
requires Olympic sports to adopt the anti-­doping regulations imposed by
WADA.
Program on Negotiation and Mediation Faculty, Northwestern University School of Law.
Juris Doctor 2010, Northwestern University School of Law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On January 7, 2010, both the boxing community and the American
economy took a hit when what was potentially the biggest fight in boxing
history was called off. The much-­anticipated March 13, 2010 bout between
Floyd Mayweather Jr., who was undefeated, and Manny Pacquiao, the
current best pound-­for-­pound fighter in the world,1 was derailed over a drug
testing disagreement.2 Mayweather insisted on Olympic-­style drug testing,
1. The Ring Ratings Pound For Pound, THE RING, http://www ringtv.com/ratings/ (last
visited Mar. 28, 2010).
2. Dan Rafael, , ESPN (Jan. 7, 2010), http://sports.espn.go.com/
sports/boxing/news/story?id=4803490.
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which would have subjected both fighters to random blood tests all the way
until the fight.3 However, Pacquaio maintained that both fighters were
subject to the procedures of the Nevada State Athletic Commission, which
would have been the athletic commission responsible for regulating the
fight.4 The Nevada commission only tests urine for banned substances
either before the fight or immediately after the fight.5
Pacquiao, who was superstitious, refused to be blood tested up until the
day of the fight because he claimed that he is weakened for up to three days
whenever he has blood removed, and he did not want to fight the biggest
fight of his boxing career in a weakened state.6 After a marathon mediation
session, the parties could not come to an agreement over drug testing pro-­
cedures.7 Even though both fighters had agreed to all other terms in the
fight contract, they could not come to consensus on this issue.8 Conse-­
quently, the fight was called off. Each fighter left an approximated $40
million payday on the table for a fight that would have generated an esti-­
mated $200 million a more than welcome revenue-­generating event
during a major recession.9 All of this was lost because of fundamental
flaws in American anti-­doping policy.
This sports catastrophe is a reminder that United States (U.S.) pro-­
fessional sports anti-­doping reform is far from over. Like boxing, the three
major American sports leagues the National Football League (NFL),
National Basketball Association (NBA), and Major League Baseball (MLB)
(collectively known as The Big Three) have a fundamentally flawed anti-­
doping approach. Boxing and The Big Three have very different structures
with respect to regulating doping: boxing uses a multi-­jurisdictional
approach, while The Big Three depend on a Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA) system.10 However, both approaches share unfortunate
characteristics they fail to effectively address doping, they will never be
able to effectively address doping, and they need a complete overhaul.
This article argues that both the boxing and CBA systems are funda-­
mentally flawed and need to be scrapped, replaced by a uniform and
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 467.850 (2010).
6. Rafael, supra note 2;; Dan Rafael, Drug Test Procedures Being Debated, ESPN (Dec. 23,
2009), http://m.espn.go.com/general/boxing/story?storyId=4766171.
7. Rafael, supra note 2.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See Paul Haagen, The Players Have Lost That Argument: Doping, Drug Testing, and
Collective Bargaining, 40 NEW ENG. L. REV. 831, 840 (2006);; Nabil Hassan, Victor Conte Slams
, BBC, http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport2/hi/boxing/8485892.stm
(last updated Jan. 28, 2010).
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unilateral system run by one independent organization. The approach to
regulate doping in professional sports needs to be radically changed because
all of these anti-­doping regimes currently have many loopholes that easily
permit athletes to dope and contain built-­in conflicts of interest that limit
effective regulation. Additionally, the CBA approach, which the biggest
American sports leagues use, has an intrinsically and thus unavoidably
sluggish approach for dealing with new doping issues, which provides
cheaters with a consistent leg up.
With regards to The Big Three, this article w
anti-­doping regime. Many experts argue that the NFL is the model citizen
when it comes to anti-­doping policies and that it is head and shoulders
above the NBA and MLB.11
best anti-­doping regime is far from adequate and fundamentally flawed.
Essentially, at its best, American sports fall significantly short from
addressing doping.
This article is divided into five sections. Section II will review the
history of doping in sports, while Section III will discuss anti-­doping leg-­
islation in the U.S. Section IV will provide an overview of anti-­doping
regimes in American professional sports, both professional leagues, and
boxing, and will also review the approach used by the World Anti-­Doping
Agency (WADA) to fight doping. Finally, Section V will present the
various problems facing the American anti-­doping system, and Section VI
will illustrate an approach that can remedy the inefficiencies of the
American system.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF DOPING
Athletes have been using substances to improve their athletic abilities
since ancient times. The attempt to get an edge over the competition is not
a new trend. Historians note that athletes dating back to the ancient Greeks,
11. See Paul A. Fortenberry & Brian E. Hoffman, Illegal Muscle: A Comparative Analysis of
Proposed Steroid Legislation and the Poli
Steroid Controversy, 5 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 121, 136 (2006);; Sarah R. Heisler, Steroid
Regulation in Professional Sports: Sarbanes Oxley as a Guide, 27 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
199, 215 (2009) (citing Judy Battista, , N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
14, 2005, at D4;; Mike Freeman, NFL is Seeing Fewer Flaws in Testing Players for Drugs, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 7, 2001, § 8, at 7;; Kathy Kiely, Focus on NBA, NHL to Improve Drug-­Testing
Policies, USA TODAY, Nov. 15, 2005, at 5c;; Mark Maske, NFL Ahead of MLB on Steroids,
WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 2004, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-­dyn/articles/A4452-­2004Dec16.
html);; Allan H. Selig & Robert D. Manfred, Jr., The Regulation of Nutritional Supplements in
Professional Sports, 15 STAN. L. & POL Y REV. 35, 54 (2004).
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and maybe even earlier, used anything they could to improve their
performance, like teas, diet alterations, ointments, and rubs.12
Unfortunately, in the twentieth century, athletes have turned to
dangerous doping substances and methods, like steroids, to improve their
athletic performance.13 Athletes dope to increase strength and muscle size,
shorten the time their bodies need to recover from injuries and workouts,
reduce body fat, and improve their ability to train for longer periods of time
at a high intensity.14 d]oping is the use of performance
15
An example of a doping method is blood oxygenation enhancement.
hemoglobin 16 This increases
-­
globin molecules can transport extra oxygen molecules throughout the
17 The extra oxygen improves athletic endurance and performance.18
One of the most infamous doping substances used in sports is the
estrogens, progestins, and corticosteroids) or hormonal substance(s), chem-­
ically related to testosterone, a male hormone that promotes muscle
19 The use of anabolic steroids can be traced back to the 1930s,
when a team of German scientists was able to create a synthetic version of
testosterone for men who had a testosterone deficiency.20 Anabolic steroids
were then used during World War II to help soldiers increase their strength
and physical performance.21
12. Heisler, supra note 11, at 205;; see Kristin Jo Custer, From Mice to Men: Genetic Doping
in International Sports, 30 HASTINGS INT L & COMP. L. REV. 181, 182 (2007).
13. See Laura S. Stewart, Has the United States Anti-­Doping Agency Gone Too Far?
Analyzin , 13 VILL.
SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 207, 208 (2006).
14. See Heisler, supra note 11, at 205.
15. Michelle Venables, Doping in Sports: Blood Oxygenation Enhancement, ILLUMIN,




19. Anabolic Steroids, CENTER FOR SUBSTANCE ABUSE RES., http://www.cesar.
umd.edu/cesar/drugs/steroids.asp (last visited Apr. 25, 2010).
20. Id.;; see also Rebecca Shore, How We Got Here: A Timeline of Performance-­Enhancing
Drugs in Sports, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Mar. 11, 2008, 3:14 PM), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.
com/2008/magazine/03/11/steroid.timeline/index.html.
21. Jim Thurston, Chemical Warfare: Battling Steroids in Athletics, 1 MARQ. SPORTS L. J.
93, 97-­98 (1990).
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Athletes began using anabolic steroids in Eastern Europe during the
1950s.22 Soviet bloc athletes, especially Olympic wrestlers and power-­
lifters, used anabolic steroids to improve their strength and performance in
competitions.23 In 1958, Dr. Ziegler, an American physician, created a
form of anabolic steroids called Dianabol, which was a major advancement
in steroids.24 Dianabol provided muscle-­building benefits without side
effects, such as prostate enlargement.25 After the advancement, anabolic
steroid use among professional American athletes also increased. During
the 1960s, anabolic steroids became widespread among American weight-­
lifters and NFL players.26
In 1975, in direct reaction to the proliferation of steroid use among
athletes, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) banned the use of
steroids in Olympic competition.27 In 1988, steroid abuse finally gained
public concern when the famous track rivalry between Carl Lewis and Ben
Johnson was marred by a steroid controversy.28 Ben Johnson, a Canadian
track star, smashed the 100-­meter dash world record and won a gold medal
at the 1988 Seoul Olympics.29 However, the IOC stripped his gold medal
when they discovered that Johnson had tested positive for the anabolic
steroid Stanozol.30
In 1998, the Tour de France was the center of a steroid scandal.31 After
a drug raid, the team director of the Festina team admitted that he oversaw
use of steroids.32 This scandal prompted stricter drug regulations
and the creation of WADA in 1999.33 WADA is an independent agency
that the international community funds with the sole purpose of cleaning up
sports.34
22. See Heisler, supra note 11, at 205;; Fortenberry & Hoffman, supra note 11, at 122;;
Thurston, supra note 21, at 98;; Anabolic Steroids, supra note 19.
23. See Heisler, supra note 11, at 205;; Fortenberry & Hoffman, supra note 11, at 122;;
Thurston, supra note 21, at 98;; Anabolic Steroids, supra note 19.
24. Thurston, supra note 21, at 98;; Shore, supra note 20.
25. Thurston, supra note 21, at 98;; Shore, supra note 20.
26. See Heisler, supra note 11, at 205;; Fortenberry & Hoffman, supra note 11, at 122;;
Thurston, supra note 21, at 98.
27. See Heisler, supra note 11, at 206;; Fortenberry & Hoffman, supra note 11, at 122;;
Anabolic Steroids, supra note 19;; Shore, supra note 20.
28. Heisler, supra note 11, at 206;; Thurston, supra note 21, at 93;; Shore, supra note 20;; see
Fortenberry & Hoffman, supra note 11, at 122.
29. Thurston, supra note 21, at 93;; Shore, supra note 20.
30. Shore, supra note 20.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See RICHARD W. POUND, INSIDE THE OLYMPICS: A BEHIND-­THE-­SCENES LOOK AT THE
POLITICS, THE SCANDALS AND THE GLORY OF THE GAMES 68-­72 (2004);; Shore, supra note 20.
34. See POUND, supra note 33;; About WADA, WORLD ANTI-­DOPING AGENCY, http://www.
wada-­ama.org/en/About-­WADA/ (last visited Apr. 25, 2010).
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During the 1990s and the early 2000s, steroids were very prominent in
American professional sports, especially baseball. During this period,
otherwise known as the steroid era, baseball experienced record home-­
runs.35 Three players collectively surpassed the thirty-­seven year-­old single
season homerun record of sixty-­one homeruns by Roger Marris in 1961 six
times.36 In 2002, Ken Caminiti admitted he used steroids during the 1996
baseball season when he won the National League Most Valuable Player
award.37 The shocking admission was followed by the Bay Area
Laboratory Co-­Operative (BALCO) scandal in 2003, where BALCO was
found supplying steroids to athletes.38 Various prominent athletes were ulti-­
operation, including track star Marion Jones and MLB players Barry Bonds,
Jason Giambi, and Garry Sheffield.39
The steroid era made doping an even more prominent social issue in
the U.S. and culminated when President George W. Bush mentioned the
need to address steroid abuse in his January 2004 State of the Union
speech.40 During the next few years, Congress tried to address doping
through various bills but was only successful in passing the Anabolic
Steroid Act of 2004.41 This Act did not do much to address doping;; it did
not require leagues to test for doping in any particular way and did not
address many substances. 42
Steroid abuse and doping in general have continued to grow. Steroid
use is no longer just a problem among professional and elite athletes;; it has
now become an epidemic among ordinary amateur athletes.43 A National
Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) study in 2008 found that 2.5% of twelfth
grade males reported using steroids during the past year.44 Because of this,
it is more important than ever for the government to step in and do some-­
thing about this issue.
35. Single-­Season Leaders & Records for Home Runs, BASEBALLREFERENCE.COM, http://
www.baseball-­reference.com/leaders/HR_season.shtml (last visited Apr. 16, 2010).
36. Id.
37. Shore, supra note 20.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Jack McCallum, The Real Dope, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Mar. 17, 2008, at 28, 28.
41. Heisler, supra note 11, at 209-­11.
42. Joseph M. Saka, Back to the Game: How Congress Can Help Sports Leagues Shift the
Focus From Steroids to Sports, 23 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH. L. & POL Y 341, 348 (2007).
43. Fortenberry & Hoffman, supra note 11, at 122.
44. NIDA InfoFacts: Steroids (Anabolic-­Androgenic), NAT L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, http://
www.drugabuse.gov/infofacts/steroids html (last visited Apr. 6, 2010).
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III. AMERICAN ANTI-­DOPING LAWS
Congress first addressed doping in 1990 with the Anabolic Steroid
Control Act of 1990 (ASCA).45 This Act added anabolic steroids to the
Schedule III list of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA).46 The ASCA
de
47 This Act also made the
possession of steroids without a prescription a felony.48
The ASCA classified twenty-­seven anabolic steroids as controlled
substances.49 However, the ASCA did not effectively address the doping
problem in the U.S. like Congress thought it would.50 Technology
improved and made steroids and other doping methods more potent and
more difficult to trace with established drug tests.51 Testing could not keep
up with the new doping methods being used by athletes.52
To combat this losing battle, the IOC created WADA, an independent
anti-­doping oversight agency.53
doping in all sports.54 A similar agency, the United States Anti-­Doping
Agency (USADA), was created under the auspices of WADA with the
purpose of making sports clean in the U.S.55 USADA has the responsibility
of keeping the U.S. Olympics, Paralympics, and sports included in the Pan
56
Fourteen years after ASCA was created, Congress realized that the leg-­
islation did not sufficiently address doping abuse.57 For example, there
were many loopholes that permitted athletes to legally use steroid pre-­
cursors.58 One loophole was that the ASCA only prohibited immediate
-­
logi 59 However, the law did not encompass
45. Saka, supra note 42, at 346.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Heisler, supra note 11, at 207.
49. Id.
50. Saka, supra note 42, at 346;; see also Heisler, supra note 11, at 208.





56. USADA History, U. S. ANTI-­DOPING AGENCY, http://www.usada.org/history (last visited
Apr. 26, 2010).
57. Saka, supra note 42, at 348.
58. Id. at 346.
59. Id.
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many other steroid precursors.60 Steroid precursors did not fall within the
defini -­
61 In essence,
this loophole allowed the continued use of steroids.
As a result, Congress enacted the Anabolic Steroid Control Act of
2004, which amended the original ASCA.62 The new legislation added
more substances, including tetrahydrogestrinone (THG), to the list of
Schedule III drugs banned in the CSA.63 Unfortunately, the Act again did
not address all steroid precursors.64 Additionally, the Act did not address
other doping substances or doping methods. While there are federal laws
that address which substances are banned, there are no laws regarding
testing procedures. The federal government has left this responsibility to
the states and the individual sports leagues.
Congress does have the constitutional right under the Commerce
Clause to regulate doping and drug testing in professional sports.65 The
Supreme Court has explicitly stated that the NFL and other professional
leagues operate in interstate commerce, which consequently permits
Congress to regulate them.66 Similarly, the Supreme Court has held that the
sport of boxing was a business that operated within interstate commerce and
thus, Congress could regulate it.67 In sum, current legislation only bans
certain substances. There is no legislation that controls drug testing in
professional sports. However, under the Commerce Clause, Congress has
the constitutional power to regulate doping and drug testing in all
professional sports, specifically boxing and the NFL.68
IV. ANTI-­DOPING REGULATION SYSTEMS
There are various manners in which doping is regulated in sports in the
U.S. and internationally. Boxing has a chaotic multi-­body regulatory
system. The NFL and other American professional sports leagues depend
on collective bargaining between owners and players associations. Finally,
60. Id. (citing Anabolic Steroids Control Act of 1990, 21 U.S.C. § 802(41)(A) (2000)).
61. Id. (citing Adrian Wilairat, Faster, Higher, Stronger? Federal Efforts to Criminalize
Anabolic Steroids and Steroid Precursors, 8 J. HEALTH CARE L. POL Y 377, 392 (2005)).
62. Id. at 348.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972);; Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445, 452 (1957);;
236, 241 (1955).
66. Radovich, 352 U.S. at 452.
67. , 348 U.S. at 241.
68. Congress has passed national regulations in the past, which gives precedent for Congress
regulating sports. See Amateur Sports Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-­606, § 1, 92 STAT. 3045, 3045-­46,
amended by Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports Act, 36 U.S.C. § 220501 et seq. (2001).
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there are independent and unilateral regulatory regimes, like WADA, which
have the exclusive authority to dictate drug policies for athletes competing
under their jurisdiction.
A. NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE (COLLECTIVE BARGAINING)
Professional athletes employed by member NFL clubs and other clubs
in American professional sports leagues are unionized.69 The National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA) requires employers and unionized employees
70 Employers cannot unilaterally make employ-­
ment rule changes regarding any subject that the NLRA requires to be
negotiated between employers and employees.71 The National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) has consistently found that drug policies that
require testing of employees is an employment subject that must be bar-­
gained over between the employer and the representative of the unionized
employees.72 Therefore, the leagues must bargain with players unions to set
or modify any drug policy. Neither club owners nor the players unions can
unilaterally promulgate any drug regulations. In other words, they need to
negotiate and come to a mutual agreement over the terms of any drug
policy.
As mentioned above, this article discusses the anti-­doping policies of
The Big Three through the prism of the NFL because the media and leg-­
isla
best and most comprehensive drug testing program.73 Paul A. Fortenberry,
in the article Illegal Muscle: A Comparative Analysis of Proposed Steroid
Steroid Controversy, argues the NFL as a whole has a superior drug policy
because it:
(1) provides a comprehensive list of banned substances, (2) tests
players during the preseason, regular season, postseason and even
during the off-­season, (3) gives the testing authority more
discretion under the Reasonable Cause Testing clause, (4) applies
69. Selig & Manfred, supra note 11, at 48.
70. See id. (quoting NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-­Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 348-­49
(1958)).
71. Id. (citing Johnson-­Bateman Co., 295 N.L.R.B. 180, 182-­83 (1989)).
72. Id. (citing Johnson-­Bateman Co., 295 N.L.R.B. at 182-­83;; Kysor/Cadillac, 307 N.L.R.B
598, 598-­99 (1992), enforced, 9 F.3d 108 (6th Cir. 1993);; Coastal Chem. Co., 304 N.L.R.B. 556,
567-­68 (1991)).
73. Id. at 54;; see Heisler, supra note 11, at 215 (citing Battista, supra note 11, at D4;;
Freeman, supra note 11, at 7;; Kiely, supra note 11, at 5c;; Maske, supra note 11);; Fortenberry &
Hoffman, supra note 11, at 136.
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beyond players, to team personnel and (5) provides greater
disciplinary remedies for violations of the policy.74
For example, the NFL conducts drug testing year round, while the
MLB tests only during the season and the NBA only tests during training
camp.75
other leagues is the fact that the NFL policy covers non-­players, while MLB
and NBA policies only cover players.76 Thus, the NFL deters trainers,
coaches, and other personnel from helping athletes dope.77
The NFL and the National Football League Players Association
(NFLPA) have a negotiated agreement regarding the regulation of steroids
and substance abuse called the National Football League Policy on
Anabolic Steroids and Related Substances (Steroid Policy). In the Steroid
Policy, the NFL addresses doping rather than doing so in their general col-­
the use of anabolic/androgenic steroids (including exogenous testosterone),
stimulants, human or animal growth hormones, whether natural or
synthetic, an 78 The NFL also prohibits
masking agents and diuretics used to hide the presence of the substances
listed above.79
The Steroid Policy outlines drug testing procedures under six
contexts pre-­employment, annual preseason testing, preseason/regular
season group testing, postseason, off-­season, and reasonable cause.80 First,
after being tested prior to employment, the Steroid Policy requires all
players to be tested for banned substances at least once per year.81 This
mandatory test is conducted during the preseason.82 The NFL also
randomly tests ten players at a time on every team each week during the
preseason and regular season.83 The Steroid Policy additionally requires the
periodic random drug testing of ten players on every team that qualifies for
74. Fortenberry & Hoffman, supra note 11, at 136.
75. Id. at 138.
76. Id. at 139.
77. Id.
78. NAT L FOOTBALL LEAGUE POLICY ON ANABOLIC STEROIDS AND RELATED
SUBSTANCES § 1 (2010), available at http://images nflplayers.com/mediaResources/files/PDFs/
PlayerDevelopment/2010%20Steroid%20Policy.pdf [hereinafter NFL POLICY].
79. Id.
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the postseason.84 The random testing continues as long the team is in the
playoffs.85
During the off-­season, any player under contract can be tested up to six
times.86 Any player selected for testing during the off-­season will be re-­
quired to furnish a urine specimen at a convenient location acceptable to the
87 The league can, but does not have to, test
free-­agent players, which are rookies or veterans that are not under contract
with a club.88 Nevertheless, the NFL does conduct annual drug testing for
draft-­eligible football players.89
Lastly, the Steroid Policy permits the league to test, on an ongoing
basis, all players that have previously tested positive for a listed banned
substance.90 These players are subject to ongoing reasonable cause testing
during the season and off-­season.91 The league can also randomly test any
player for which it has reasonable basis to conclude has violated the
policy.92 However, a player can only be tested a maximum of twenty-­four
times every year.93
All testing is subject to the testing procedures outlined in section 3B of
the Steroid Policy. Every player is notified on the day of the test that he
will be tested.94 The NFL does not conduct blood doping tests;; only urine
tests are conducted.95
96
A player is subject to discipline if he violates the policy.97 A violating
player can be suspended or, if appropriate, can have his affiliation with the
NFL terminated.98 Any suspended player is not paid during the duration of
the suspension.99










93. Id. § 2.
94. Id. § 3B.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. § 5.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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suspended for a minimum of four regular season or postseason games
without pay.100 If a player violates the policy for a second time, he is sus-­
pended without pay for a minimum of eight regular season or postseason
games.101 Finally, if a player violates the policy for a third time, he is
suspended for a year without pay.102 Such a player needs to petition for re-­
instatement and is not necessarily guaranteed reinstatement.103
B. BOXING (MULTI-­JURISDICTIONAL SYSTEM)
Boxing is regulated on a on a multi-­body basis. In other words, state
commissions and boxing sanctioning organizations regulate boxing
together. The states regulate any boxer fighting in their jurisdiction, while
the sanctioning organizations regulate any boxer fighting for their title. The
sanctioning organization gives the boxers permission to fight for the title,
but these boxers can negotiate to fight in the state of their choice. Thus, if
Boxer A wants to defend his title, he must follow the procedures of the
rganization, separately choose a venue for his fight, and
follow the procedures outlined by the state hosting the fight event.
Both the states and the sanctioning organizations have their own anti-­
doping policy. Fighters must follow both in order to avoid punishment by
either body. In practice, these overlapping anti-­doping policies supplement
each other. The state can have an anti-­doping measure that the sanctioning
organization does not address and vice-­versa.
State commissions are responsible for regulating boxing in order to
protect the health and safety of boxers.104 State commissions are also re-­
sponsible for qualifying referees and judges and licensing fighters,
managers, and promoters.105
that is not regulated by a single governing body. In the [U.S.], each com-­
mission has different rules when it comes to drug testing, with the Nevada
State Athletic Commission (NSAC), for example, responsible for all fights
106 Therefore, boxers are subject to the anti-­
doping policy of the state in which they fight. In order to review the anti-­
doping approach taken by state commissions, this article will discuss the




104. Michael J. Jurek, Janitor or Savior: The Role of Congress in Professional Boxing
Reform, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1187, 1198 (2006).
105. Id.
106. Hassan, supra note 10.
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anti-­doping policies of NSAC and the California State Athletic Commission
(CSAC), two of the most prominent state commissions.
The NSAC prohibits boxers from using any steroid or substance listed
in the current Prohibited List published by WADA.107 However, boxers
only need to submit to a urine analysis if directed to do so by the commis-­
sion.108 If the commission decides to test fighters, it can only test fighters
before or immediately after fights.109 Thus, boxers do not have to be tested
for steroids. If a fighter tests positive, he is subject to discipline by the
NSAC.110 However, the NSAC does not have any guidelines on dis-­
ciplining violating fighters.111
The lack of guidelines manifests itself in the inconsistent disciplining
the NSAC has imposed in the past. For the most part, the NSAC has been
consistent with regards to punishing athletes that use banned substances by
punishing athletes that tested positive for nine months.112 For example, the
NSAC fined boxer Fernando Vargas $100,000 and suspended him for nine
months after testing positive for the illegal steroid Stanozolol after his
September 14, 2002 fight with Oscar De La Hoya.113 On the other hand,
the NSAC suspended mixed martial arts fighter Kimo Leopoldo for only six
months after testing positive for the same steroid, Stanozolol, after his June
19, 2004 fight.114 Furthermore, the NSAC suspended Julio Cesar Chavez,
Jr., son of legend Julio Cesar Chavez, for only seven months and fined him
ten percent of his $100,000 purse for testing positive for the banned diuretic
Furosemide after his November 14, 2009 fight.115
The CSAC only requires fighters to submit urine samples for analysis
to detect steroid or other banned substance use either before or after the
fight.116 The commission has the discretion to decide whether to test before




111. See generally id.
112. See John Morgan, NSAC Issues Karo Parisyan Nine-­Month Suspension: UFC 94 Win
Overturned, MMAJUNKIE.COM (Mar. 17, 2009), http://mmajunkie.com/news/14288/nsac-­issues-­
karo-­parisyan-­nine-­month-­suspension-­ufc-­94-­win-­overturned mma;; Ivan Trembow, Bonnar
Suspended 9 Months For Steroid Use, MMAWEEKLY.COM (Nov. 3, 2006), http://mmaweekly.
com/bonnar-­suspended-­9-­months-­for-­steroid-­use-­2.
113. Michael Katz, Vargas Suspended for Positive Test, N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2002, at D7.
114. Mike Sloan, Kimo Suspended Six Months, Fined $5,000, SHERDOG (Aug. 16, 2004),
http://www.sherdog.com/news/news/Kimo-­Suspended-­Six-­Months-­Fined-­5000-­1938.
115. Brett Okamoto, Julio Cesar Chavez Jr. Receives Seven-­Month Suspension, LAS VEGAS
SUN (Mar. 1, 2010), http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2010/mar/01/julio-­cesar-­chavez-­jr-­
receives -­seven-­month-­suspens/. lp cut weight or
Id.
116. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 4, § 303(b) (2009).
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or after the fight, but it is unclear how the commission determines when the
tests will be conducted.117 Like the NSAC, CSAC does not test randomly
1) Stimulants (2)
Narcotics (3) Cannabinoids (marijuana) (4) Anabolic agents (exogenous
and endogenous) (5) Peptide hormones (6) Masking agents (7) Diuretics (8)
Glucocorticosteroids (9) Beta 2 agonists (asthma medications) (10) Anti-­
118 Like
the NSAC, the CSAC also does not have any guidelines on disciplining vio-­
lating fighters.119
Additionally, boxing is regulated by various worldwide sanctioning
organizations. There are three prominent sanctioning organizations
World Boxing Association (WBA), International Boxing Federation (IBF),
and the World Boxing Council (WBC).120 These organizations are mostly
responsible for ranking fighters and sanctioning title bouts. Nevertheless,
they also have their own anti-­doping policies, albeit much less compre-­
The WBA prohibits the use of any steroids or substances listed as a
121 Drug testing is only mandatory in World
Championship fights.122 The drug testing is conducted in the form of a
urine analysis and is required to be taken before and/or after the fight.123
However, the WBA does not mention the procedure for determining when
the test will be conducted, and rather only states that the time and place of
the test has to be announced to the fighter at some point prior to the test.124
The WBA may also periodically test fighters who have previously tested
positive for a banned substance. However, the WBA only tests fighters that
are fighting in a World Title bout.125
117. Id.
118. Id. § 303(c).
119. See generally id.
120. Jurek, supra note 104, at 1196.
121. Rules of World Boxing Association, WORLD BOXING ASS N, http://wbanews.
com/artman/publish/regulations/WBA_Rules_Adopted_in_Punta_Cana_2008.shtml (last visited
Apr. 9, 2010). The IOC does not publish a prohibited list of banned substances and doping
methods. WADA publishes a list of prohibited substances and doping methods, which the IOC
follows. Nonetheless, the WBC says it adheres to the IOC list. See World Anti-­Doping Code,
WORLD ANTI-­DOPING AGENCY, http://www.wada-­ama.org/en/World-­Anti-­Doping-­Program/
Sports-­and-­Anti-­Doping-­Organizations/The-­Code/ (last updated Oct. 2010).
122. Rules of World Boxing Association, supra note 121, at app. A art. 13, app. C art. 45.
123. Id. at app. A art. 13.
124. Id.
125. Id. at app. C art. 45.
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The WBA outlines various ways that fighters are disciplined when they
test positive for banned substances. If a fighter in a World Championship
fight fails a test, he is not able to fight for a WBA championship for two
years, unless he can present medical evidence demonstrating his rehabilita-­
tion.126 -­
stances can be rated, retain a title, or be permitted to fight in a sanctioned
bout for a period of no less than six months from the date of the positive
test. 127
The WBC has similar drug testing regulations. Drug tests are only re-­
quired for world title fights or elimination fights.128 Otherwise, the WBC
does not require testing for boxers involved in normal bouts. The testing is
done in the form of a urine test.129 The WBC requires that the urine test be
conducted after a fight and will not test fighters before fights, unless the
state hosting the fight has a law that requires testing before the fight.130
The policy prohibits the use of stimulants, diuretics, sedative hypnotics,
131
It is unclear whether steroids and other performance enhancing drugs fit
within one of those listed categories.132 If a boxer in a championship fight
tests positive in an anti-­doping test, he cannot fight for a title for a year.133
However, if the champion wins and tests positive and the losing challenger
does not test positive, the champion will only face the punishment of losing
his title.134 This is an odd punishment structure because it appears that a
champion who wins a fight and tests positive receives a less severe punish-­
ment than a champion who loses a championship fight and tests positive.135
Unlike the WBA and the WBC, the IBF requires all of its fighters to be
tested, regardless the type of fight.136 A urine analysis is conducted immed-­
iately after every fight.137 The IBF has a distinct list of banned substances,
which include Methadone, Barbiturates, D-­Amphetamine, Morphine,
126. Id. at app. A art. 13.
127. Id. at app. C art. 45.
128. Rules and Regulations, WORLD BOXING COUNCIL, http://www.wbcboxing.com/
downloads/NEW_RULES_AND_REGULATIONS_WEB_FINAL_2009.pdf (last visited Apr. 9,
2010).
129. Id. § 4.9(e).
130. Id.
131. Id. § 4.9(g).
132. Id.
133. Id. § 4.9(h).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Rules for IBF, USBA, & Intercontinental Championship and Elimination Bouts, IBF/
USBA, 6 (July 2006), http://www.ibf-­usba-­boxing.com/rules/boutrules [hereinafter IBF & USBA
Rules].
137. Id.
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Glutethimide, Marijuana, Meperidine, Chlorpromazine, Tetrahydrocan-­
nabinol, PropoxypheneCodeine, Anabolic Steroids, Quinine, Cocaine, and
Pain Killers.138 The IBF does not outline its punishment for fighters that
test positive for banned substances.139 Thus, the IBF has significant dis-­
cretion when imposing punishment for violations.140 For example, in 2000,
then IBF champion Roy Jones Jr. tested positive for the IBF banned sub-­
stance Androstenedione after his win.141 The IBF took a lenient stance by
letting Jones Jr. keep his belt and not fining or suspending him for his
positive test.142
C. WADA
Unlike the NFL, WADA is an independent agency with the ability to
unilaterally regulate doping without having to bargain with its members.143
144 WADA
is a Swiss private law foundation.145 -­
146 In 2002,
WADA released the World Anti-­Doping Code (the Code), which is a
uniform set of anti-­doping rules that all WADA members follow.147 The
Code replaced the Olympic Movement Anti-­Doping Code from 1999.148
The Code was revised in 2009.
-­doping rules govern all Code signatories, which
include the IOC, International Federations, International Paralympic Com-­
mittee, National Olympic Committees, and other sporting bodies.149 For
example, the International Basketball Federation (FIBA) became a signa-­
tory of the 2009 revised WADA Code.150 As a result, every national gov-­




141. Hassan, supra note 10.
142. Id.
143. Selig & Manfred, supra note 11, at 44.
144. About WADA, supra note 34.
145. Id.
146. WADA History, WORLD ANTI-­DOPING AGENCY, http://www.wada-­ama.org/en/About-­
WADA/History/WADA-­History/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2010).
147. Id.
148. In re CONI, Case No. 841, Advisory Opinion, 5 (Court of Arbitration for Sport 2005).
149. World Anti-­Doping Code, supra note 121, at 16.
150. New FIBA Internal Regulations Governing Anti-­Doping, CHINESE OLYMPIC
COMMITTEE (Aug. 1, 2009), http://en.olympic.cn/news/doping_control/2009-­01-­08/1714763 html.
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sub
the Code to prevent the use of these substances.151
In general, the Code is a very harsh and strict document.152 The Code
g-­
part be
demonstrated in order to establish an anti-­ 153 Code sig-­
154 This document
prohibits an extensive list of anabolic steroids, peptide hormones, growth
factors, Beta-­2 agonists, hormone antagonists and modulators, diuretics,
other masking agents, and doping methods.155 rnational
Standard for Testing delineates the exact method of testing for such pro-­
hibited substances.156
WADA requires organizations under it to conduct both in-­competition
and out-­of-­competition testing.157 In-­competition testing refers to the
eriod commencing twelve hours before a Competition in which the
and drug testing related to the competition.158 Thus, organizations under
WADA must test throughout the entire year, whether the athletes are
actively competing or not. With few exceptions, athletes are not notified
ahead of time that they are being tested or where the test will be con-­
ducted.159
Athletes subject to out-­of-­competition testing or in-­competition testing
can be selected in two ways. WADA members must conduct both target
tests and random tests. In target testing, athletes are selected on a non-­
random basis.160 Their selection can be based on, but not limited to, the fol-­
lowing reasons:
151. See Daniel Gandert, The World Anti-­Doping Agency as an Institution (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the Northwestern University School of Law Program on Negotiation and
Mediation).
152. Haagen, supra note 10, at 838.
153. World Anti-­Doping Code, supra note 121, § 2.1.1.
154. See id. § 4.
155. The 2011 Prohibited List, WORLD ANTI-­DOPING AGENCY (Sept. 18, 2010), http://
www.wada-­ama.org/en/World-­Anti-­Doping-­Program/Sports-­and-­Anti-­Doping-­Organizations/
International-­Standards/Prohibited-­List/.
156. See generally International Standard for Testing, WORLD ANTI-­DOPING AGENCY (Jan.
1, 2009), http://www.wada-­ama.org/en/World-­Anti-­Doping-­Program/Sports-­and-­Anti-­Doping-­
Organizations/International-­Standards/Testing/.
157. World Anti-­Doping Code, supra note 121, § 5.1.1.
158. International Standard for Testing, supra note 156, § 3 (emphasis omitted).
159. Id. § 4.3.10.
160. Id. § 3.1.
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[g]oing into or coming out of retirement;; [b]ehavior indicating doping;; [and
161
On the other hand, WADA members can randomly select athletes for
162 Again, athletes who are either randomly selected or
target selected for testing will not know that they are being tested until a
few moments before testing.
The WADA Code does not specify exactly which athletes should be
targeted for testing, how many tests are conducted, or what types of test
should be conducted. However, WADA recognizes that signatories may
have limited resources.163 Consequently, WADA leaves it to signatories to
prioritize their testing needs and best use their resources.164 For example, it
is up to signatories to plan how many urine tests compared to blood tests
will be conducted.165
WADA also requires that members create testing pools in order to
effectively conduct out-­of-­
whereabouts.166 WADA states that having information regarding an
-­season or out-­of-­competition period is
critical in order to test them without warning and prevent them from
evading drug detection.167 All athletes placed in testing pools must provide
information about their whereabouts during various times of the year,168
making them subject to testing.169 WADA states that without this infor-­
170
WADA has very harsh punishments for athletes who are caught
committing a doping offense. A first violation is a two-­year suspension and
a second violation is a lifetime ban.171 Lastly, WADA has sole discretion
with regards to which substances are banned.172 Signatories do not have
any say as to which substances are banned. Despite this rule, the Code
permits athletes governed by the Code to appeal culpability and sentences
161. Id. § 4.4.2 (emphasis omitted).
162. Id. § 3.2 (emphasis omitted).
163. Id. § 4.3.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. § 11.1.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. § 11.4
170. Id. § 11.1.1.
171. World Anti-­Doping Code, supra note 121, § 10.7. Section 10.7 outlines other penalties
for other types of violations, such as trafficking of banned substances. Id.
172. Id. § 4.3.3.
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imposed on them with regards to a Code violation.173 Athletes can bring
such an appeal to the Court of Arbitration of Sport.174 Because all signa-­
tories must follow the rules promulgated by WADA,175 WADA unilaterally
implements the anti-­doping policy.
V. A FUNDAMENTALLY FLAWED AMERICAN SYSTEM
The approach to regulating doping in American professional sports is
fundamentally flawed. The following section will review the different ways
in which the NFL, with its collective bargaining approach, and boxing, with
its multi-­jurisdictional approach, fail to effectively address steroid reg-­
ulation.
A. COLLECTIVELY BARGAINED FOR ANTI-­DOPING FAILURE
1. Massive Loopholes
Even though many laud the NFL Steroid Policy, it has various loop-­
holes
in-­season random testing is structured in a way that allows players to know
that they cannot be tested on game days.176 Many experts, including Gary
predictable testing framework
allows athletes to outmaneuver testing with fast acting steroids and masking
agents.177 Wadler also mentioned that giving players a cushion from being
tested on game days does not make sense because the extra time allows
athletes to use masking agents, provides enough time to flush the body of
-­free urine.178
Second, if a player cannot provide a urine sample when selected to do
so, no one chaperones the athlete when he produces the make-­up urine
sample at a later time.179 Essentially, a player can use this loophole in an
attempt to circumvent testing. For example, a player could force himself not
to urinate when selected for testing;; then, when not being chaperoned
during the make-­
173. Id. § 13.2.
174. Id. § 13.2.3.
175. See FIFA & WADA, Case No. 976 & 978, Advisory Opinion, 209 (Court of Arbitration
for Sport 2005), http://www rdes.it/RDES_2_06_fifa&wada.pdf (determining that FIFA was
mpic movement).
176. Heisler, supra note 11, at 215 (citing Michael S. Schmidt, Doping Experts Find
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Third, if these loopholes are not enough, the Steroid Policy contains a
. . . tests
results will be protected to the maximum extent possible, recognizing that
players who are disciplined for violating [the Steroid] Policy will come to
180 Essentially,
the NFL minimizes punishment and determent with regards to doping.
They refuse to release positive test results in order to protect players from
being publicly chastised. This is a suspect rule with suspect motivation. It
seems the NFL does not want to do the most it can to deter doping in its
sport.
Last, a Minnesota l
ineffective in Minnesota. Recently, two Minnesota Vikings players tested
positive for a banned substance and were subsequently suspended by the
NFL.181 However, they filed a suit in a Minnesota state court claiming a
182
Steroid Policy has significantly weakened the Policy. Because the case is
still pending in the Minnesota court, the NFL cannot act on the violations
until the case is decided. If the Minnesota law holds up in court, a player in
one state could have the advantage of taking a substance that a player in
another state could not.183 Consequently, in order to be fair and uniform
with regards to its Steroid Policy, the NFL deferred the suspension of two
New Orleans Saints players charged with the same violation,184 meaning
that the Minnesota law has forced the NFL to change the way it enforces its
Steroid Policy. This situation could reoccur with regards to another rule of
the Ste
The NFL Steroid Policy has many weaknesses that are caused and exa-­
cerbated by the fact that the collective bargaining process has built in con-­
flicts of interests and a cumbersome process for modifying the policy itself.
The following section will discuss the conflicts of interest that impede the
NFL and other sports leagues from effectively regulating doping.
180. NFL POLICY, supra note 78, § 13A.




184. Smith, Grant to Play for Saints, ESPN.COM (Sept. 15, 2009), http://sports.espn.go.com/
nfl/news/story?id=4476485.
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2. Conflicts of Interests
Players and owners developing an anti-­doping policy through the col-­
lective bargaining process have a conflict of interest that significantly
hampers the creation of an effective anti-­doping policy. As much as every-­
one loves their professional teams, sports are a business for everyone who is
involved, especially the owners and players. Both parties have millions of
dollars at stake when it comes to their respective sport, league, and team.
When owners and players negotiate the terms to the collective bargaining
agreement, it is no surprise that they try to negotiate with their best interests
in mind;; negotiating the terms of the anti-­doping policy is no different.
Unfortunately, a truly effective anti-­
interest and thus, they are motivated to install a lenient and porous policy
with many loopholes.
Both owners and players financially benefit from doping.185 Players
that dope usually perform better.186 The better the athletes perform, the
more revenue the owners make. The more revenue owners make, the more
valuable players are to their owners.187 The more valuable players are, the
higher their salaries are.188
Additionally, many players can only reach the professional level by
o-­
189 Players who feel this pressure have no desire for a harsh anti-­
doping policy.190 Both parties have a lot to gain from doping and thus, it is
no surprise that the collective bargaining process leads to poor anti-­doping
policies.
Players are also motivated to negotiate a lenient anti-­doping policy to
avoid financial penalties.191 Violating anti-­doping policies can lead to fines
and suspensions.192 Further, suspensions can be very costly for athletes
because clubs withhold wages from suspended athletes.193
Another reason athletes are motivated to shy away from strict policies
is the fact that they have an interest in maintaining a positive image in the
185. Tiffany D. Lipscomb, Can Congress Squeeze t
The Constitutionality of Congressional Inter





190. Id. at 317-­18.
191. Id. at 318.
192. Id.
193. Id.
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eyes of the public.194 A positive image is important to athletes because it
implicates their legacy in the sport and can affect their ability to attract
endorsements. Doping or being suspected of doping can severely damage a
Barry Bonds, Mark McGwire, and Alex Rodriguez.195 Doping has tar-­
nished their legacies so much that these players, once considered
guaranteed for the Hall of Fame, might not be elected.196
Developing effective anti-­doping policies in the collective bargaining
process is also hindered by the fact that both owners and players view anti-­
doping regulations as simply a bargaining chip. Bud Selig, long time com-­
missioner of Major League Baseball
bargaining, parties attempt to achieve gains in certain core areas (such as
payroll regulation), often as a trade-­off for, or at the expense of, not making
197 Thus, it is
difficult to balance the various interests of the parties and, unfortunately,
anti-­doping is not at the top of their lists.198
In sum, negotiating anti-­doping policies through the collective bar-­
gaining process subjects policy-­making to conflicts of interests. It is no
surprise the NFL and the other major sports leagues in the U.S. have
various loopholes and ineffective regulations. Furthermore, this process
will undoubtedly continue producing more ineffective regulations in the
future and prolong doping indefinitely. The collective bargaining process
dooms the development of proper regulations.
3.
but it is also negatively affected by the fact that every modification to the
Steroid Policy requires a mutual agreement between both the owners and
labor issue that must be collectively bargained for. Neither owners nor
players can unilaterally decide what the policy should look like.
Consequently, every issue regarding drug testing in the NFL must be
negotiated.
address new developments in doping, such as new drugs or evasion
194. Id.
195. See id. at 318-­19.
196. See id. at 319.
197. Selig & Manfred, supra note 11, at 57.
198. See id.
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techniques. Negotiations take time and consequently, the NFL cannot and
has not been able to quickly address new doping developments. The col-­
lective bargaining process weighs down the NFL. As long as the NFL
addresses doping through the collective bargaining process, it will forever
be on the losing side of a cat and mouse game with cheaters. Similar to
reaction towards implementing Human Growth Hormone (HGH) blood
testing is a perfect example of this flaw.
first positive result for HGH ever. The athlete, Terry Newton, was tested
by a United Kingdom Anti-­Doping Agency and was banned from
competition for two years.199 WADA, together with the United Kingdom
Anti-­Doping Agency, conducted the blood test.200
A blood test for HGH has existed since the 2004 Athens Olympics and
has been available in the U.S. since 2008.201 Travis Tygart, the executive
director of the United States Anti-­Doping Agency, explained that WADA
offers the HGH blood test.202 He mentioned that extensive research has
been conducted that shows that the test is scientifically valid.203 WADA
authorities, such as the Agency Director General David Howman, look at
204
While WADA has quickly addressed this new medical advancement,
bargaining process has clearly slowed down the mighty NFL, which was
praised for its anti-­doping policy. In January of 2010, the NFL told the
NFLPA about its interest in testing for HGH.205 However, an NFLPA rep-­
time. . . 206 Similarly, George Atallah, the NFLPA assistant executive
director of external affairs, told the New York Post,
believe that blood-­testing for NFL players will or should be imple
199. Lance Pugmire, HGH Testing Receives a Boost:
Could Aid Efforts By Baseball and the NFL, Which Are Pushing To Conduct Blood Testing, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 25, 2010, at C1.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. NFL, Union At Odds Over HGH Test, ESPN.COM, http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/
story?id=4940922 (last updated Feb. 24, 2010).
203. Id.
204. Pugmire, supra note 199.
205. Id.
206. Id.
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-­testing
207 Testing for HGH became a part of the
2011 Collective Bargaining Agreement, however, the NFLPA refused to
agree to the details, which has resulted in increased delays for the im-­
plementation of the test.208
not, the NFLPA does not want to address the apparently reliable HGH drug
test. Even though there appears to be abundant scientific research about the
-­
pendent analysis of the test, which naturally is delaying the implementation
of the test.209
from testing anymore, and the pressure is on all sports leagues to implement
210
It takes two in the collective bargaining process and that is why, when
it comes to addressing doping the process is flawed. If one party delays or
has a strict position on an issue, like the NFLPA has with regards to HGH,
then a new doping development cannot be addressed. By the time the NFL
begins testing for HGH, cheaters will have moved on to another doping
method, which the NFL does not test for. This is occurring now and will
ultimately occur again in the future. At its best, the NFL will always be
behind the curve when it comes to regulating doping.
flawed. The Steroid Policy allows players to dope and evade detection.211
These loopholes and ineffective regulations are caused by the fact that the
Steroid Policy is negotiated through the collective bargaining process. Both
negotiating parties have other interests that conflict with the idea of im-­
plementing effective anti-­doping policies.212 Furthermore, the collective
bargaining process requires both parties to negotiate the terms of every rule.
207. NFL, Union At Odds Over HGH Test, supra note 202. 
208. See Union's Questions Unaswered as Clock Ticks on HGH Testing for 2011 Season,
WASHINGTON POST (Oct. 7, 2011), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/redskins/
unions-­questions-­unanswered-­as-­clock-­ticks-­on-­hgh-­testing-­for-­2011-­season/2011/10/07/gIQA5
uOVTL_story html for a description of how disagreement between the union and the league is
continuing to prevent the NFL from implementing HGH testing.
209. Gary Myers, NFL Union Changing Stance On HGH Blood Test Under New Union
Chief DeMaurice Smith, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Feb. 27, 2010), http://www nydailynews.com/sports/
football/2010/02/27/2010-­02-­27_union_changing_stance_on_hgh_blood_test.html.
210. Pugmire, supra note 199.
211. See Jarrett Bell, NFL Drug Program Called Flawed, USA TODAY, Mar. 31, 2005, at
1C.
212. See Juliet Macur, N.F.L. Falls Short of a Leap on H.G.H., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2011, at
D1 (providing Travis Tygart, the Chief Executive of the United States Anti-­ -­
cription of why it is problematic for doping controls in sport to be negotiated).
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Having to negotiate every term prevents the NFL from quickly addressing
new doping issues. In essence, the collective bargaining process has led to
the current ineffective anti-­doping policies and inevitability will lead to
further ineffectiveness.213
B. BOXING ANARCHY
-­doping approach is utterly chaotic and like the NFL, it
falls flat. Current boxing anti-­doping regulations are very limited and
permit boxers to easily dope while evading detection. Furthermore, like the
NFL, the parties making the regulations have conflicts of interest that
prevent them from implementing effective policies to rid the sport of drugs.




1. Pathetic Anti-­Doping Regulations
First, the state athletic commissions and boxing sanctioning organiza-­
tions all implement egregiously limited testing. For example, while the
CSAC requires drug testing before and after all fights, it does not test all
fighters during their fight preparation.216 The WBA only tests fighters com-­
peting in championship fights,217 while the WBC similarly tests only
fighters competing in title or elimination bouts.218 Both test fighters im-­
mediately after the bout.219 Along the same lines, the IBF tests all fighters
competing under its organization, but only tests fighters after they
compete.220
and when it does test, it only tests before or immediately after the fight.221
213. See Mark Maske, Still No Resolution Over HGH, WASH. POST, Aug. 25, 2011, at D07; 
Eddie Pells, Questions from NFL Union Put HGH Testing in Jeopardy, DENVER POST, Oct. 7, 
2011, http://www.denverpost.com/sports/ci_19064491 (describing the way that even though the 
NFL agreed to adding an HGH test to its 2011 Collective Bargaining Agreement, the details 
negotiated between the union and league have prevented the test from taking place). 
214. Hassan, supra note 10. Interestingly, Conte is again providing supplements to athletes
and worked with WADA to catch dopers. Conte pleaded guilty in 2005 to conspiracy to distribute
steroids and money laundering as a result of his involvement with BALCO. See David Kravets,
Balco Founder Admits Steroid Distribution, THE INDEPENDENT, July 16, 2005, at 54.
215. Hassan, supra note 10.
216. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 4, § 303 (2009).
217. Rules of World Boxing Association, supra note 121, at app. C art. 45.
218. Rules and Regulations, supra note 128, § 4.9.
219. Id. § 4.9(e)(1);; Rules of World Boxing Association, supra note 121, at app. A art. 13.
220. IBF & USBA Rules, supra note 136, at 6.
221. NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 467.850(5) (2010).
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At its best, these regulatory bodies only conduct in-­competition testing
and completely ignore out-­of-­competition testing. Fighters can easily dope
athletes have advisors who understand that all you have to do [to evade
box 222 In other
words, many boxers have doping experts advising them on how to evade
detection based on the sporadic testing.
Boxing also falls short when it comes to banning substances and pun-­
ishing fighters that violate the anti-­doping policy. For example, the NSAC,
CSAC, and IBF have no guidelines for punishing fighters that violate the
anti-­doping policy.223 Without guidelines, exterior pressures and con-­
flicting interests can influence the individuals determining punishments.
Consequently, inconsistent punishments are implemented.
As mentioned above, the NSAC suspended Fernando Vargas for nine
months, while it punished Julio Cesar Chavez, Jr. for only seven months
and Kimo Leopoldo for six months for similar violations.224 Vargas and
Leopoldo took a banned steroid and Chavez took a diuretic, which masks
the use of similar steroids.225 In a more extreme case, the IBF did not even
punish Roy Jones, Jr., the then champion and pound-­for-­pound best fighter
in the world, in any way for taking the banned substance
Androstenedione226
best fighter in the world. Without guidelines, commissions and organ-­
izations have the ability to impose lenient punishment when it is beneficial
to them.
Furthermore, every state has a different list of banned substances.
There is no uniform set of banned substances, which could potentially give
certain fighters an unfair advantage, because they could take a substance in
one jurisdiction, which boxers fighting in other states could not take. In
other words, a fighter can develop his career in a state that allows the
fighter to dope in manners other states do not allow. Staying in that state
would allow the fighter to perform better and, thus, have more exciting
fights. Exciting fights and boxers make more money. A fighter can use the
more le
anti-­doping regulations are simply pathetic and do not in any way address
doping in the sport.
222. Hassan, supra note 10.
223. See generally CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 4, § 303 (2009);; NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 467.850;;
IBF & USBA Rules, supra note 136.
224. Katz, supra note 113;; Okamoto, supra note 115;; Sloan, supra note 114.
225. Katz, supra note 113;; Okamoto, supra note 115;; Sloan, supra note 114.
226. Hassan, supra note 10.
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2. Conflicts of Interest
Similar to the NFL, those individuals who are responsible for imple-­
menting anti-­doping rules in boxing are afflicted with conflicts of interest,
which impedes the development of viable and effective rules. Fights, and
especially championship fights, are a significant source of revenue for both
states and sanctioning organizations. Fights attract tourism and consumer
spending to states.227 Thus, states want to attract the best fighters in order
to host the best fights. Hosting the best fights will generate more revenue
for the states. States are financially motivated to regulate doping leniently,
because lenient policies will entice the better performing doping fighters to
arrange fights in their state.
Sanctioning organizations are also financially motivated to implement
lenient anti-­doping policies. In order for boxers to fight for an official title,
purse.228 If the fighters do not pay the fee, they cannot fight for the title or
be recognized as an official champion.229 The more revenue a title fight
creates, the more the sanctioning organization makes off of its title fee.
Better fighters create more revenue and, thus, get larger purses. Con-­
sequently, these organizations have a large interest in having the best
boxers fight for their titles.
It is important to note that the better the boxers are that fight for a
sanc
more prestigious a title is, the more the best fighters in the world will want
to win that title. If the best fighters want to win that title, the sanctioning
organization will attract the best fights, which will generate larger title fees.
Again, the bigger the purse, the more the sanctioning organization makes,
making the sanctioning organizations motivated to leniently regulate doping
in order to attract the best performing fighters as possible.
As explained above, fighters, like other athletes, perform better and
recover from injuries more quickly when they dope.230 Better fighters gen-­
erate more revenue and have bigger fight purses the same way that better
performing football players draw more revenue for the NFL.231
Consequently, implementing strict drug testing is not i
227. See Mola Lenghi, NMB Hopes Fighting Will Attract Tourism, CAROLINALIVE.COM
(Aug. 23, 2010), http://www.carolinalive.com/news/story.aspx?id=500932.
228. Jurek, supra note 104, at 1196.
229. Id.
230. Lipscomb, supra note 185, at 317.
231. Id.
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Restricting doping could possibly hinder the performance of fighters.
If one state highly restricts fighters, fighters will simply go and fight in
another state that is more lenient. Additionally, if a sanctioning orga-­
nization regulates fighters too strictly, fighters will choose to instead fight
sanction a title fight misses a chance to collect a significant fee. A three
percent fee of a $20 million purse is worth $600,000, which is very
significant. Essentially, the sanctioning organizations and state have a
major conflict of interest that motivates them to implement lenient anti-­
doping policies. Boxing itself is not capable of addressing its poor anti-­
doping policies.
VI. THE REMEDY
The inadequacies of the American anti-­doping approach can be
effectively remedied by implementing a system similar to WADA: one in-­
dependent organization unilaterally making decisions regarding anti-­doping
policies. WADA currently has stricter and more effective anti-­doping
policies than the NFL and boxing, all of which are a result of WADA being
an independent and unilaterally operating agency. For example, the WADA
Code provides for much harsher sanctions for athletes who violate its anti-­
doping rules. While the NFL, whose penalties are much harsher than those
in boxing, punishes first time offenders with a four-­month suspension and
second time offenders with an eight-­month suspension, the WADA Code
punishes first time offenders with a two-­year ban and second time offenders
with a lifetime ban.232
test for more drugs than does the NFL and boxing. For example, both the
Australian Sports Anti-­Doping Agency and the United Kingdom Anti-­
tests in their respective professional rugby leagues.233 The NFL and
232. Many critics found
time offenses led to a lifetime ban. As a result, WADA adapted their code to allow for reduced
sanctions in attempt to help athletes who are accidentally accused. See Daniel Gandert, Puerta:
Applying the Principles of Justice to the World Anti-­Doping Code 2 (2010) (unpublished man-­
uscript) (on file with author).
233. Pugmire, supra note 199;; Brent Read, NRL Agrees To Blood Testing For Human
Growth Hormone, THE AUSTRALIAN (Mar. 18, 2010), http://www.theaustrailian.com/au/news/
sports/nrl-­agrees-­to-­flood-­testing-­for-­human-­growth-­hormone/story-­e6frg7mg-­1225842167575;;
WADA President Praises Australian National Rugby League for Adopting Blood Testing, WORLD
ANTI-­DOPING AGENCY (Mar. 19, 2010), http://www.wada-­ama.org/en/News-­Center/Articles/
WADA-­President-­Praises-­Australian-­National-­Rugby-­League-­for-­Adopting-­Blood-­Testing/.
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boxing, on the other hand, do not permit blood testing and in no way
address the use of HGH.234
WADA also bans doping methods that American sports do not address.
transfer,235 while the NFL, NSAC, CSAC, IBF, and WBA do not explicitly
ban these modern doping methods.236 The NSAC and WBA prohibit sub-­
stances banned by WADA, but do not explicitly say that they prohibit those
doping methods banned by WADA. Only the WBC bans blood doping
methods, such as infusions of blood, red cells, and plasma expanders.237
Additionally, organizations following the WADA Code provide more
extensive testing than the broken boxing anti-­doping systems. Unlike
boxing, WADA conducts out-­of-­competition testing.238 WADA can
prevent the scenario in which boxers dope during their training camps and
wane off of the drugs by the time of the fight to go undetected.
While the NFL does conduct effective out-­of-­competition or off-­season
testing, it conducts very poor in-­competition or in-­season testing.239 As
ex
know when they are going to be tested. On the other hand, organizations
following the WADA Code test athletes on the same day of the competition
and also test athletes on any other day of the quarter without providing
advance notice.240 Athletes competing under organizations following the
WADA code cannot predict when they will be tested and, as result, cannot
strategically avoid detection like athletes can in the NFL.
The conflicts of interest both the NFL and boxing face can easily be
remedied by divesting all anti-­doping policy responsibilities to one indepen-­
dent agency. In American professional sports, the same parties who have
financial stakes in the sport have the responsibility of making anti-­doping
234. See Maske, supra note 213;; Pells, supra note 213 (describing the way that the NFL has
bargaining agreement, since the union has not reached an agreement with the league regarding the
details of the testing programme).
235. The 2011 Prohibited List, supra note 155, § M1.
236. CAL CODE REGS Tit. 4, § 303(c) (2009);; NEV ADMIN CODE § 467.850 (2010);; NFL
POLICY, supra note 78;; IBF & USBA Rules, supra note 136;; Rules of World Boxing Association,
supra note 121.
237. Rules and Regulations, supra note 128, § 4.9(g)(2).
238. See James Halt, a , 20 MARQ.
SPORTS L. REV. 267, 272 (2009).
239. NFL POLICY, supra note 78.
240. International Standard for Testing, supra note 156, § 11.4.2.
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policies. However, as explained above, it is in their financial interest to not
stringently enforce doping restrictions.241
Divesting the anti-­doping responsibilities to one independent agency
would erase the conflicting interests. An independent agency, such as
WADA, is sheltered from most external pressures, and can act in the way
that is best to achieve the goal of cleaning sports. For example, although
WADA receives half of its funding from international sports federations,
WADA has no direct financial stake in any sport. 242 In other words, it does
not profit directly when a certain league or event has success. It does not
care whether the athletes create more revenue through their doping induced
performances.
Additionally, WADA is kept independent by the fact that the IOC
requires its members to join WADA.243 Even if these federations did not
help fund WADA, they would be required to join WADA as a result of
being a part of the Olympic movement.244 Thus, WADA can avoid external
pressures because those who financially fund WADA cannot influence
purpose of ensuring clean sports.245 Having an independent agency make
anti-­doping rules is the logical way to remedy the conflict of interest that
afflicts the American anti-­doping system. It is important to note that an
independent agency, such as WADA, does not guarantee that doping will be
completely removed from sports.246 However, it does address steroid use
much more effectively. An independent agency only faces the daunting
challenge of catching cheaters and does not face the challenge of dealing
with other competing interests.
Furthermore, it is crucial that the independent agency have the
complete ability to unilaterally implement its policies. In other words,
creating anti-­doping policies should not be a part of the collective bar-­
gaining process. As exemplified by the HGH ordeal, the collective
bargaining process prevents the NFL from quickly addressing new doping
241. See Macur, supra note 212 (providing description about the problem of finan-­
cial implications getting in the way of effective drug testing).
242. About WADA, supra note 34.
243. World Anti-­Doping Code, supra note 121, at 16.
244. Olympic Charter, art. 25.
245. wide campaign for doping-­
free sport. About WADA, supra note 34.
246. As stated by John Fahey, the president of the World Anti-­ there will
always be athletes who will attempt to get an edge over their competitors in any possible way.
John Fahey, President, WADA, Introductory Remarks at WADA Press Conference, Vancouver
(February 11, 2010), available at http://www.wada-­ama.org/Documents/News_Center/News/1/
Intro_remarks_JFahey_PC_Vancouver_11Feb.2010.pdf.
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developments.247 Sports leagues depending on collective bargaining will
always be unnecessarily late in addressing doping issues.
Action must be taken to implement an independent unilateral anti-­
doping regulatory system and Congress would be a logical candidate to
spearhead such an initiative. As explained above, Congress would have the
constitutional ability to implement or be a part of such change.248 Congress
could, for example, create an independent anti-­doping agency similar to
WADA and require that all sports adhere to its anti-­doping regulations.
Congress would need to use its constitutional ability to regulate profes-­
sional sports and create a federal law that would remove the regulation of
doping in sports from the realm of the NLRA.249 Thus, anti-­doping reg-­
ulations would not be something sports leagues would be required to col-­
lectively bargain over.
Similarly, states would no longer need to regulate doping in boxing.
Sanctioning organizations, many of which are internationally based, could
continue to implement their own anti-­doping regulations on boxers fighting
in the U.S. However, there would be no need for the sanctioning organiza-­
tions to even be involved with anti-­doping in the U.S. because all of the
boxers fighting under these organizations would still have to adhere to the
-­doping rules, which would be far more compre-­
hensive. Ultimately, American sports will not begin to be cleansed of
doping until an independent and unilateral agency controls anti-­doping
regulation.
VII. CONCLUSION
In sum, the American anti-­doping approach must be changed.
Individual sports cannot be given the impractical responsibility of regu-­
lating themselves. Conflicts of interest and the collective bargaining
process prevent the implementation of effective anti-­doping rules in
American sports. The status quo will not fix doping abuse in American
sports. An independent agency that can unilaterally implement anti-­doping
rules can address the shortcomings the American system suffers from. This
is a call of action to clean American sports.
247. See , supra note 208 (describing of how disagreement
between the union and the league is continuing to prevent the NFL from implementing HGH
testing).
248. Radovich
N.Y., 348 U.S. 236, 241 (1955).
249. This could be similar to the Ted Stevens Amateur and Olympic Sports Act,, 36 U.S.C. § 
220501, where Congress used its authority to regulate the Olympic sports and to put them under 
the control of the United States Olympic Committee.
